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Abstract
Purpose – The purpose of the paper is to examine how much difference in income can be explained by familial
culture that persists in different societies.
Design/methodology/approach – We employ a two-step methodology to evaluate the impact of familial
culture on income across countries. In the first step, we construct the macro measures of familial culture from
micro survey data. In the second step, the growth model is estimated.
Findings – First-step micro regression results show that family is more important to female, richer, highly
educated, unemployed and married individuals. Male, poorer, less educated and unemployed individuals are
more likely to respect and love parents unconditionally. The same group is also more likely to think that
parents must do the best for their kids. Finally, the macro results show that the strength of national familial ties
explains significant differences in income across countries.
Research limitations/implications – We show that countries with weak family ties are richer than those
with strong family ties. These results are useful for policymakers who design public policies that accommodate
the type of familial culture that persists in their society.
Originality/value – We construct the macro measures of familial culture from the micro survey data. The
paper adds to the literature on the effect of culture on income at the macro level.
Keywords Culture, Family ties, Income across countries, A two-step methodology
Paper type Research paper

1. Introduction
In recent years, there has been considerable studies examining how much variation in income
across countries is determined by culture. One type of culture that is often studied in the
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literature is interpersonal trust which is used to measure the social capital of a country.
Although there are still debates on how the measure of trust can be constructed at the country
level, several studies have shown that this social capital matters for the country level of
income (see Algan and Cahuc, 2010; Dearmon and Grier, 2009; Guiso et al., 2005; Knack and
Keefer, 1997; Lim et al., 2018; Tabellini, 2010 Temple and Johnson, 1998; Zak and Knack, 2001;
Whiteley, 2000) [1]. Another type of culture that has also emerged as an important factor
influencing economic outcomes is family structure, which measures how strong the tie is
among members of a family. While many studies have established empirical evidence for the
impact of familial culture on economic outcomes at the individual/household level, there are
no studies, to our knowledge, examining the impact of national familial culture on income at
the macro level.
In this paper, we examine the impact of national familial culture [2] on per-capita income
across countries. The country-level measure of familial culture is not readily available. We
employ the method used in Di Tella et al. (2001) and Wolfers (2003) on studying life
satisfaction and Lim et al. (2018) on studying interpersonal trust to construct such a measure
of familial culture from the individual survey data. The advantage of using this method is
that it removes personal or socio-economic characteristics that may influence individual
perception about family when responding to the survey questions. For instance, unemployed
individuals may perceived family more important since they depend on family during this
economic hardship; and the perception on family duties may also differ across age groups and
levels of education and income. Therefore, it is imperative that we remove these individual
characteristics and experiences in order to obtain the average value of family culture that
persists at the national level.
This paper contributes to the literature in a number of ways. First, we construct familial
culture that measures the ties within a typical family in countries across the globe. The
measure is constructed from survey data by removing the variation due to individual and
socio-economic characteristics. The measure could become useful for other researchers in
their culture research on comparative studies of countries around the world. Second, the
paper expands the knowledge in the growth literature and growth–culture nexus in
particular. We correlate the constructed measures of national familial culture with per-capita
income across countries to explain how much variation in income is determined by familial
culture.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the relevant literature on
family ties and economic consequences. Section 3 details the methodology and data. Section 4
discusses the micro-regression results and Section 5 presents the macroeconomic impact of
national familial culture on income across countries. Section 6 concludes the findings and
provides the implication of the findings.
2. Literature review
Reher (1998) examines the persistent contrasts of family structure across Western Europe
with the Mediterranean region mostly characterized by strong family ties and the central and
northern Europe including the United States characterized by weak family ties. The strength
of family ties lies on family loyalties, allegiances and authority which define the tradition in
which family group has priority over individual or individual values have priority over
everything else. Reher emphasizes one important aspect of family life: the transition of young
members of the family. In northern Europe and the United States, young adults normally
leave home and venture on their own independence, while in Mediterranean Europe the
departure from parental home generally happens when they find a stable job or get married.
Based on these family structures, Reher provides some implications for the social and
economic outcomes that prevail in these societies. The incidence of homelessness is much
greater in a weak family society like the United States than in a strong family society like

Spain, although the former has a lower unemployment rate than the latter. Reher further
suggests that a society with weak family ties tends to be more associational and dynamic
with individual responsibility and initiatives as an integral part of the society whereas a
society with strong family ties tends to be more passive, but more oriented toward social
cohesion.
While Reher (1998) provides observable distinctions between family structures in
Western Europe, Giuliano (2007) tested empirically if culture matters for living arrangements
among young adults. Giuliano shows that there is a strong association between the fraction of
second-generation immigrants who stay home with their parents in the US and the
corresponding fractions in the countries where their parents came from. In a subsequent
study, Alesina and Giuliano (2010) provides additional evidence for the impact of this family
culture on several economic outcomes at the household level including home production and
family size, labor force participation of women and youngsters and geographical mobility of
young adults.
Alesina and Giuliano (2010) show that the stronger family ties increase home production
and family size, reduce labor participation rate of women and young adults and also lower
youth geographical mobility. Families with strong family ties rely less on market and
government and more on family members for home production such as child care, home
cooking, caring for the elderly, house cleaning etc. The division of labor between men and
women is also clearly defined in multi-generation families with strong family ties, and home
activities are often performed by women in such societies. It is also evident that the culture of
strong family ties is associated with bigger families of coresidence with adult children. Given
that social insurance can only be provided if families live together, the cost of moving away
for young adults to pursue better employment opportunities increases (see also Alesina et al.,
2015). This reduces the labor force participation of both women and young adults.
Alesina et al. (2015) empirically show that individuals with strong family ties are likely less
mobile, have lower income, are more often unemployed and support more stringent labor
market regulations. They suggest that because firms in a flexible labor market can extract
monopsony rents, the geographical mobility of workers is necessary for the market to be
efficient. However, in societies with strong family ties, individuals choose a more regulated
labor market to limit monopsony power of the firms and are willing to accept lower wages and
higher unemployment.
In addition, Bentolila and Ichino (2008) show that in Mediterranean societies, where young
adults live with their parents, unemployment shocks cause less consumption losses because
their family provides insurance. Women with strong family ties have a lower fertility rate.
Guiliano (2007) suggests that in Southern Europe family ties are strong and young adults
only leave home when they get married. Sexual revolution has allowed these youths to stay
home longer and prolong their marriage. As a result, fertility has fallen (see also Rosina, 2004
for the case of Italy).
While there is well-established empirical evidence for the economic impacts of family
culture at the household level, the evidence at the macro level is nonexistent. In a very early
study of family culture, Banfield (1958) contends that in societies where children learn to trust
and rely on their own extended family and learn not to readily trust those outside of the
family, the accumulation of social capital is lacking and formal institutions and economic
cooperation are not fully developed (Alesina and Giuliano, 2010). That is, the structure of
family as it exists in a country defines the development of institutions that persists in that
country, and these types of institutions have long-run macroeconomic consequences.
Therefore, it is essential to understand how much variation in income across countries can be
explained by its national familial culture.
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3. Estimation strategy and data
3.1 Estimation strategy
We employ a pooled cross-sectional regression to estimate the relationship between national
familial culture and per-capita income. The equation is specified as follows:
Yit ¼ β0 þ β1 Yi0 þ β2 Xit þ β3 SFTit þ eit
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(1)

where Yit is the income per capita of country i at year t and Yi0 is the initial income per capita.
Xit is the vector of control variables that may codetermine income per capita and the strength
of family ties. SFTit is the variable of interest which represents the strength of family ties in
country i. eit is the error term.
The control variables are used to address the endogeneity problem that may arise from
factors codetermining the variable of interest (strength of family ties) and the dependent
variable (income). These control variables include a measure of openness in a country and the
quality of political institutions. From Adam Smith’s Wealth of Nation to the recent evidence of
Sachs and Warner (1995) and Frankel and Romer (1999), a country with a friendly
international trade policy is associated with a higher standard of living and economic growth.
This increase in income comes from its ability to utilize comparative advantage in trade,
knowledge spillover from international commerce and an increase in the efficiency of
domestic firms due to global competition. At the same time, there is every reason to also
believe that globalization influences culture and cultural traits of a society (see Holton, 2000;
Machida, 2012). So for this reason, trade openness has to be controlled for in the regressions.
Similarly, the level of economic development and culture can also be simultaneously
determined by political institutions. Przeworski et al. (2000) discussed the association
between political transition and economic development, and Acemoglu et al. (2001) argued
that the quality of institutions matter for differences in income. Tabellini (2010) examines the
data across European regions and finds that political institutions in the distant past in Europe
determine individual cultural values and beliefs which are correlated with current economic
development. Hence, controlling for political institutions in the regressions will help deal with
the endogeneity problem.
The data on the strength of familial culture are not available at the country level. The survey
data obtained from the WVS and EVS are available at the individual level. Thus, we use a
method used by Di Tella et al. (2001), Wolfers (2003) and Lim et al. (2018) to construct the countrylevel measures of familial culture. Di Tella et al. (2001) and Wolfers (2003) construct a countrylevel measure of life satisfaction from individual responses in a survey data set by obtaining
average residuals for each country in the sample, and Lim et al. (2018) construct a country-level
measure of interpersonal trust using a similar method. The advantage of the method is that it
extracts the components of familial culture that persist and are not influenced by the external
factors such as education, personal income, employment and other individual characteristics;
thus, the method may partially reduce measurement problems at the country level. More
specifically, we perform micro-regressions using individual responses to the questions related to
one’s perception of the tie within a family [3]. Then, the individual-level residuals from these
regressions are averaged for each country by the year of the survey to generate a country-level
measure of familial culture. The micro-regression equation is specified as
(2)
Vjit ¼ α0 þ α1 Zjit þ ujit
where j stands for individuals. Vjit represents various individuals’ responses about their
perception of family ties. Zjit is a vector of respondent’s characteristics which include gender, age,
level of education, income, employment status and marital status. ujit is the error term. The
estimates of the error term ðb
ujit Þ is averaged for country i by the survey year to proxy for the
measure of familial culture at the country level (SFT).

3.2 Data description
We construct our main variable, the strength of familial culture, from three different variables
in the surveys that capture the perception of the importance of family in an individual’s life,
the respect and love for one’s own parents and the duties and responsibilities of parents
toward children. These three variables are similar to those used in Alesina and Giuliano
(2010). These variables are sourced from the World Values Survey (WVS) and European
Values Survey (EVS). The WVS is administered to a representative sample of people in 85
countries in five waves (1981–1984; 1989–1993; 1994–1999; 1999–2004; and 2005–2009) and
the EVS in 31 European countries in three waves (1981–1984; 1990–1993; and 1999–2004).
The two sources are two large-scale, cross-national and longitudinal survey research
programs, which include a large number of questions, which have been replicated since the
early 1980s. The WVS and the EVS agreed to use a common dictionary to harmonize the
variables and data. Apart from a few exceptions, a country participated either in an EVS
wave or in a WVS wave but not in both [4]. Therefore, the data from both sources can be
merged using the instruction and syntax provided on their websites [5]. Merging the two
sources substantially increases the sample countries. The observations are not in a
continuous time series since the surveys are conducted for different years and for different
countries within the waves. After combing the two sources, we have a total of 96 countries in
the sample.
Now we discuss the variables used to construct the measures of familial culture. The first
variable (IMPORTANCE) assesses the importance of the family in one’s life. The question is
worded as “For each of the following aspects, indicate how important it is in your life. Would
you say it is: Family?” The answer takes the values from 1: Very important, 2: Rather
important, 3: Not very important and 4: Not at all important. We recoded the data with 4 being
very important and 1 being least important to be used in the ordered regression.
The second variable (DUTY) assesses the perception of respondents about the duties and
responsibilities of parents toward children. The question is worded as “Which of the following
statements best describes your views about parents’ responsibilities to their children?” The
possible answer is: A. Parents’ duty is to do their best for their children even at the expense of
their own well-being; B. Parents have a life of their own and should not be asked to sacrifice
their own well-being for the sake of their children. This variable (DUTY) is coded as 1 if A is
chosen and zero if B is chosen. This variable represents parents’ ties to their children.
The third variable (LOVE) assesses the perception of respondents about the respect and
love for one’s own parents. The question is worded as “With which of these two statements do
you tend to agree?” The possible answer is: A. Regardless of what the qualities and faults of
one’s parents, one must always love and respect them; B. One does not have the duty to
respect and love parents who have not earned it by their behavior and attitudes. This variable
is coded as 1 if the respondent chooses A and zero if B is chosen. This variable represents
children’s ties to their parents.
We construct two composite measures of the strength of familial culture. The first
composite variable (PRINCIPAL) is calculated by extracting the first principal component
from all three survey questions – IMPORTANCE, LOVE and DUTY – and the second
composite variable (SUM) is calculated by taking the sum of the three variables. Thus, the
familial culture is defined by the strength of the ties among family members. A higher
number corresponds to stronger family ties. Table 1 presents the correlation at the country
level between the two composite measures of national familial culture and the three variables
from which they are constructed. IMPORTANCE, LOVE and DUTY are highly and
positively correlated with both SUM and PRINCIPAL. SUM is almost perfectly correlated
with PRINCIPAL. This indicates that the principal component variable distributes similar
weighting to IMPORTANCE, LOVE and DUTY [6]. However, the correlation among
IMPORTANCE, LOVE and DUTY is somewhat smaller, indicating that they do not measure
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(IMPORTANCE)
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Table 1.
Correlation among
national familial
culture variables

Parental
duties
(DUTY)

Respect and
love parents
(LOVE)

Family importance
1.000
(IMPORTANCE)
Parental duties
0.509
1.000
(DUTY)
Respect and love
0.357
0.264
parents (LOVE)
National familial
0.761
0.733
culture (SUM)
National familial
0.728
0.769
culture
(PRINCIPAL)
Note(s): The correlations are calculated at the country level

National
familial
culture
(SUM)

National familial
culture
(PRINCIPAL)

1.000
0.786

1.000

0.771

0.998

1.000

the same family value. For example, the correlation between the duties and responsibilities of
parents (DUTY) and the respect and love for one’s own parents (LOVE) is only 0.264 and that
between the importance of family (IMPORTANCE) and the respect and love for one’s own
parents (LOVE) is 0.357.
For macroeconomic variables, the income per capita is measured by per-capita gross
domestic products expressed in 1990 international Geary–Khamis dollars. The data are
extracted from the Maddison database. Initial GDP per capita in 1973 is used to control for the
early stage of development. The year 1973 is chosen because the data are available for some
former Soviet States which are included in our sample. The openness variable, a measure of
trade to GDP ratio, is obtained from the World Penn Table 7.1. The quality of political
institutions is measured by the index, Polity2, taken from Polity IV database. This variable
was originally scaled from 10 to 10. Higher values correspond to more democratic political
institutions. We rescale the variable between 0 and 20 for convenience. Table 2 provides a
summary of the data description and sources.
4. Micro-regression results of the perception about family
In this section, we relate the individual characteristics to every measures of the strength of
familial culture including the composite variables. Equation (2) is estimated for each measure
of familial culture including the three components of the composite measures. Table 3
displays the results. We use different estimation methods depending on the nature of the
dependent variable. The ordered probit regressions are performed for the importance of
family (IMPORTANCE) due to the ordinal outcomes of the variable which range from 1 to 4 in
the order of importance. The probit regressions are used for the perception of parents’ duties
and responsibilities toward their children (DUTY) and the perception of respect and love for
one’s own parents (LOVE). The OLS estimation is used for the composite measures of familial
culture.
We first discuss the results in columns (1), (2) and (3) for IMPORTANCE, DUTY and
LOVE, respectively. The estimates for gender show that family is more important to women
than to men; however, males are more likely than females to believe that parents have the
duties and responsibilities to do the best for their kids and one must always love and respect
their parents unconditionally. The coefficient estimates for the age variable shows that older
individuals think that parents have the duty to do the best for kids. This result is consistent
with the altruistic behavior of parents.

Variable

Description

Source

Notes

Family importance
(IMPORTANCE)

Scale from 1 (not
important at all) to 4
(very important)
Binary variable (A 5 1;
B 5 0)

WVS and
EVS

Respect and love
parents (LOVE)

Binary variable (A 5 1;
B 5 0)

WVS and
EVS

Per-capita GDP
(GDPP)

1990 international
Geary–Khamis dollars

Openness (OPEN)

Trade to GDP ratio

Political institutions
(POLITY2)

Scale from 0 to 20

The
Maddison
database
World Penn
Table 7.1
Polity IV
database

For each of the following aspects,
indicate how important it is in your life.
Would you say it is: Family?
Which of the following statements best
describes your views about parents’
responsibilities to their children?
A. Parents’ duty is to do their best for
their children even at the expense of
their own well-being
B. Parents have a life of their own and
should not be asked to sacrifice their
own well-being for the sake of their
children
With which of these two statements do
you tend to agree?
A. Regardless of what the qualities and
faults of one’s parents, one must always
love and respect them
B. One does not have the duty to respect
and love parents who have not earned it
by their behavior and attitudes
Per-capita GDP in 1973 is used as the
initial level of development. The log
form is used in the regressions

Parental duties
(DUTY)

WVS and
EVS

The score ranges from 0 (autocracies) to
20 (democracies)

The coefficient for income is positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that richer
people value family more importantly. The result is consistent with Becker (1993) and Becker
et al. (1977) who argue that wealthier individuals are more likely to stay in the marriage than
poorer ones because the gains from marriage are much greater for richer couples. However,
the negative coefficients for income in the DUTY and LOVE regressions indicate that richer
people feel less obligated to do the best for their children or less likely to have unconditional
love for their parents.
The employment status is divided into three groups – the employed, the unemployed and
the inactive – which includes the retirees, housewives and students. The unemployed is
included as the reference group. The coefficient for the employed is negative while that for the
inactive is positive. The results suggest that family is less important for the employed than
the unemployed. This evidence is consistent with that found in Bentolila and Ichino (2008) for
the Mediterranean societies where the unemployed have depended more on family insurance
to mitigate the consequences of unemployment shocks.
For the marital status, the reference group is represented by those who are divorced,
separated and widowed. The results show that married individuals view family more
important than the divorced. The result is consistent with the welfare maximizing behavior
(see Becker, 1993). However, it is interesting that single individuals are less likely than the
divorced to view family as very important. The results from the DUTY and LOVE
regressions are intuitive. Married individuals are more likely than the divorced group to think
that one should have unconditional love for their parents or one should do the best for their
kids. Similarly, the single are also more likely than the divorced to think so.
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Estimation method
Explanatory var.

IMPORTANCE
Ordered probit
(1)

DUTY
Probit
(2)

Dependent variable
LOVE
Probit
(3)

PRINCIPAL
OLS
(4)

SUM
OLS
(5)

Constant
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Table 3.
Micro-regressions:
National familial
culture

2.766***
0.803***
1.223***
0.056***
5.533***
(0.026)
(0.024)
(0.025)
(0.020)
(0.013)
Male
0.189***
0.025***
0.018**
0.037***
0.030***
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.008)
(0.007)
(0.004)
Age
0.004***
0.002***
0.001
0.001**
0.001***
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.001)
(0.000)
(0.000)
Income
0.028***
0.009***
0.042***
0.013***
0.007***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Education
0.008***
0.040***
0.039***
0.032***
0.021***
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.002)
(0.001)
(0.001)
Employed
0.054***
0.027*
0.060***
0.034***
0.021***
(0.013)
(0.014)
(0.015)
(0.011)
(0.008)
Inactive
0.015
0.081***
0.064***
0.064***
0.042***
(0.014)
(0.015)
(0.015)
(0.012)
(0.008)
Married
0.409***
0.163***
0.200***
0.290***
0.201***
(0.011)
(0.013)
(0.013)
(0.011)
(0.007)
Single
0.067***
0.011
0.043***
0.004
0.001
(0.015)
(0.016)
(0.016)
(0.014)
(0.010)
0.028
0.012
0.018
0.025
0.025
(Pseudo) R2
Observations
216,775
139,012
147,555
136,438
136,438
Note(s): Income is a scale from 1 to 10 (highest income group). Education is a scale from 1 to 8 (finish
university). Employed is a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is on full-time work, part-time work or
self-employed and zero otherwise; inactive is 1 for those who are retired, housewives and students and zero
otherwise; and unemployed is the base group. Married is also a binary variable equal to 1 if the individual is
married or living together as married and zero otherwise; single refers to those who are single or never get
married. The marital base group is divorced, separated and widowed. Robust standard errors are in
parenthesis; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and ***significant at 1%

The results for both composite variables, PRINCIPAL and SUM are consistent. Women have
stronger ties in the family than men. The strength of familial culture decreases with age,
income or education. While family ties are stronger for the unemployed than the employed,
they are stronger for the inactive than the unemployed. Family ties are stronger among the
married individuals than those who are divorced, separated or widowed (reference group).
Then, we compute the strength of familial culture at the country level by taking the mean
residuals of these five regressions. Table 4 presents the summary statistics of the mean
residual measures of national familial culture.

National familial culture

Table 4.
Summary statistics:
residual national
familial culture at the
country level

Obs.

Mean

Std. Dev.

Min

Max

PRINCIPAL
124
0.031
0.374
0.975
0.683
SUM
124
0.020
0.247
0.623
0.455
IMPORTANCE
174
0.008
0.147
0.601
0.190
DUTY
124
0.002
0.204
0.605
0.374
LOVE
124
0.019
0.214
0.858
0.278
Note(s): PRINCIPAL, SUM, IMPORTANCE, DUTY and LOVE are the mean residuals of the first principal
component, the sum composite, the importance of family variable from orbit regression, the importance of
family variable from OLS regression, the parents’ duties and responsibilities variable and the respect and love
for one’s parents, respectively

5. The strength of national familial culture and income across countries
This section presents the macroeconomic impact of national familial culture on income per
capita. First, we present the results without any controls except for the initial development.
The dependent variable is the log of real GDP per person. The 1973 per-capita income,
LGDPP73, is included to control for the initial level of development which may also
codetermine the current strength of national familial culture and current economic
performance. We test the two composite measures of family ties, columns (1) for
PRINCIPAL and (2) for SUM; then, we test each of three variables that measure the
perceptions about family and the ties within the family, columns (3) for IMPORTANCE, (4) for
DUTY and (5) for LOVE; and finally the three variables are included in the same regression.
Table 5 presents the association between various measures of national familial culture and
income. Overall, the results show that the strength of national familial culture is negatively
associated with income. The coefficients of PRINCIPAL and LOVE are negative and statistically
significant at the 10% and 1% level, respectively. An increase in family ties (PRINCIPAL) by one
standard deviation is estimated to cause income per person to drop by about 8%. The magnitude
is really significant and that for LOVE is even greater. The result for LOVE seems consistent
with the proposition that the ties of children to their parents, which limit the youths’ geographic
mobility, have consequences on their income. This happens at the macro level as well.
Even if we are able to confirm a negative relationship between the strength of national
familial culture and income across countries, the endogeneity problem at the macro level
could be a concern. The causal effect of the strength of national familial culture on income can
be asserted only if the two variables are not codetermined by a third factor. As discussed in
the methodology, the literature has pointed to two main variables – globalization and political
institutions – that may simultaneously influence income per person and the cultural traits.

Explanatory var.
Constant
LGDPP73
PRINCIPAL
SUM
IMPORTANCE

(1)
1.251**
(0.511)
0.892***
(0.052)
0.212*
(0.122)

Dependent variable: Log of per-capita income (LGDPP)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
1.185**
(0.511)
0.897***
(0.052)

1.582***
(0.465)
0.910***
(0.040)

0.933*
(0.541)
0.930***
(0.048)

2.242***
(0.505)
0.840***
(0.055)
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(6)
2.237***
(0.517)
0.851***
(0.064)

0.274
(0.183)
0.040
(0.211)

0.026
(0.278)
DUTY
0.201
0.234
(0.216)
(0.245)
LOVE
0.913***
0.931***
(0.202)
(0.210)
Observation
120
120
168
120
120
120
0.741
0.741
0.693
0.735
0.750
0.852
Adj. R2
Note(s): The dependent variable is measured by the log of the per-capita GDP in 1990 international Geary–
Khamis dollars. Per-capita GDP in 1973 (LGDPP73) is used as the initial level of income. PRINCIPAL is the
county-level mean OLS residuals of the strength of national familial culture – the first principal component.
SUM is the county-level mean OLS residuals of the strength of national familial culture – the sum.
IMPORTANCE is the country-level mean ordered probit residuals from the importance-of-family equation.
DUTY is the country-level mean probit residuals of the duties-and-responsibilities-of-parents-and-children
equation. LOVE is the country-level mean probit residuals of the respect-and-love-for-parents equation. The
regressions control regional dummies which are statistically significant but not reported to save space. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and ***significant at 1%

Table 5.
Macro-regressions:
national familial
culture and income
across countries

JES
49,2

222

Thus, both the level of openness (OPEN) and democracy (POLITY2) are controlled for in the
regressions.
Table 6 displays the results. The results provide stronger evidence for the negative impact of
national familial culture on income. The estimates for both PRINCIPAL, SUM and LOVE are
negative and statistically significant. From the results across all three different measures of perceived
family ties, LOVE – the measure of perception that one should have unconditional love for their
parents – has a dominant impact on the level of income, which still is consistent with our earlier result.
As for the controls, the initial income per capita measured by the real GDP per capita in 1973
is positive and statistically significant at the 1% level throughout the regressions. The results
are consistent with the literature of economic growth (Algan and Cahuc, 2010). Without the
controls of several other characteristics, the results do not provide evidence of conditional
convergence but possibly suggest that countries with higher level of income in the past could
manage to accumulate higher capital and raise labor efficiency to stay ahead today. Next, the
political institutions carry a significant positive sign. This indicates that highly democratic
institutions are beneficial for economic development. Finally, the globalization variable is
positive in all regressions but only statistically significant in one of them.
One may argue that the reverse causality could be present at the macro level as well. To
further address the concern, the dependent variable (real GDP per capita) is replaced by its
lead from one to four years. We also use a 5-year average and 10-year average of real GDP per
capita. The regressions are run for the composite measure of national familial culture and its
individual components. The results presented in Table 7 are still consistent, qualitatively and

Explanatory var
Constant
LGDPP73
OPEN
POLITY2
PRINCIPAL
SUM

1.836***
(0.544)
0.827***
(0.073)
0.001
(0.001)
0.028***
(0.009)
0.299**
(0.146)

Dependent variable: Log of per-capita income (LGDPP)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
1.763***
(0.544)
0.836***
(0.073)
0.001
(0.001)
0.028***
(0.009)
0.406*
(0.223)

1.819***
(0.471)
0.837***
(0.062)
0.002**
(0.001)
0.031***
(0.008)

0.154
(0.268)

1.426**
(0.583)
0.887***
(0.074)
0.001
(0.001)
0.026***
(0.009)

2.697***
(0.515)
0.738***
(0.067)
0.001
(0.001)
0.023***
(0.008)

(6)
2.661***
(0.514)
0.744***
(0.068)
0.001
(0.001)
0.023***
(0.008)

0.073
(0.312)
DUTY
0.122
0.146
(0.232)
(0.247)
LOVE
0.955***
0.945***
(0.203)
(0.211)
Observations
115
115
161
115
115
115
0.831
0.830
0.825
0.824
0.850
0.864
Adj. R2
Note(s): The dependent variable is measured by the log of the per-capita GDP in 1990 International Geary–
Khamis dollars. Per-capita GDP in 1973 (LGDPP73) is used as the initial level of income. PRINCIPAL is the
county-level mean OLS residuals of the strength of national familial culture – the first principal component.
SUM is the county-level mean OLS residuals of the strength of national familial culture – the sum.
IMPORTANCE is the country-level mean ordered probit residuals from the importance-of-family equation.
DUTY is the country-level mean probit residuals of the duties-and-responsibilities-of-parents-and-children
equation. LOVE is the country-level mean probit residuals of the respect-and-love-for-parents equation. The
regressions control regional dummies which are statistically significant but not reported to save space. Robust
standard errors are in parenthesis; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and *** significant at 1%
IMPORTANCE
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(1)

0.727***

0.856

0.838

(0.206)

(0.202)
0.854

115

0.896***

0.890***

0.84

0.001

115

(0.129)

0.288**

(0.008)

0.024***

(0.001)

0.702***

0.118

(0.008)

0.020**

(0.001)

0.001

(0.065)

0.837

0.851

115

(0.209)

0.881***

(0.239)

0.146

0.168

115

0.784***
(0.071)

3.153***
(0.518)

(0.316)

(0.238)

115

2.361***
(0.546)

0.84

115

(0.123)

0.296**

(0.008)

0.022***

(0.001)

0.001

(0.069)

0.775***

(0.537)

2.487***

0.852

115

(0.206)

0.826***

(0.236)

0.122

(0.316)

0.168

(0.008)

0.019**

(0.001)

0.001

(0.064)

0.701***

(0.507)

3.196***

LGDPPtþ4

Dependent variable
LGDPPtþ3

(0.315)

0.06

(0.008)

0.018**

(0.001)

0.001

(0.065)

0.149

115

2.957***
(0.515)

(0.243)

(0.306)

(0.131)

0.016

0.265**

(0.130)

(0.008)

0.022**

(0.001)

0.814***

0.248*

0.017**

(0.008)

0.022**

(0.008)

0.001

0.001

(0.001)

0.001

(0.001)

(0.071)

0.748***

(0.065)

0.836***

(0.070)

2.115***
(0.545)

2.765***

(0.508)

1.907***

LGDPPtþ2

(0.533)

LGDPPtþ1

0.844

115

(0.131)

0.226*

(0.009)

0.022***

(0.001)

0.001

(0.070)

0.843***

(0.526)

1.801***

0.86

115

(0.199)

0.873***

(0.237)

0.155

(0.302)

0.056

(0.008)

0.017**

(0.001)

0.001

(0.065)

0.755***

(0.503)

2.667***

LGDPP5

115
0.871

0.858

(0.185)

0.789***

(0.227)

0.125

(0.292)

115

(0.126)
0.032

0.016**
(0.007)

0.021***
(0.008)
0.218*

0.001
(0.001)

0.001

0.763***
(0.062)

0.841***
(0.067)
(0.001)

2.595***
(0.485)

1.830***
(0.507)

LGDPP10

Note(s): The dependent variable is measured by the log of the per-capita GDP in 1990 International Geary–Khamis dollars. Per-capita GDP in 1973 (LGDPP73) is used as
the initial level of income. PRINCIPAL is the county-level mean OLS residuals of the strength of national familial culture – the first principal component. SUM is the
county-level mean OLS residuals of the strength of national familial culture – the sum. IMPORTANCE is the country-level mean ordered probit residuals from the
importance-of-family equation. DUTY is the country-level mean probit residuals of the duties-and-responsibilities-of-parents-and-children equation. LOVE is the countrylevel mean probit residuals of the respect-and-love-for-parents equation. The regressions control regional dummies which are statistically significant but not reported to
save space. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis; *significant at 10%, **significant at 5% and ***significant at 1%.

Adj. R2

Observations

LOVE

DUTY

IMPORTANCE

PRINCIPAL

POLITY2

OPEN

LGDPP73

Constant

Explanatory var.
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quantitatively. The estimate for the composite variable indicates that a one standard
deviation increase in the strength of family reduces real GDP per capital by about 8–11%.
6. Conclusions
Whether the strength of national familial culture matters for income is the central question in
this study. We employ a two-step methodology to evaluate the impact of national familial
culture on economic performance across countries. First-step micro-regression results show
that family is more important to female, richer, highly educated, unemployed and married
individuals. Male, poorer, less educated and unemployed individuals are more likely to
respect and love parents unconditionally. The same group is also more likely to think that
parents must do what is in the best interest for their kids.
The results from the second step show that the strength of familial culture explains
differences in income across countries. Countries with stronger family ties have lower income.
This evidence suggests that the culture of family that exists in a society defines the types of
institutions that persist in that society and matters for its overall macroeconomic
development. The evidence is consistent across the composite measures of national
familial culture and with various controls. These results are useful for policymakers who
design public policies that accommodate the type of familial culture that persists in their
society.
Notes
1. Several other studies also examine the transmission of this cultural trait (trust) across generations
(see Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Guiso et al., 2008; Lim and Morshed, 2019; Nunn and
Wantchekon, 2011).
2. In this paper, we use the terms – familial culture, family structure and family ties – interchangeably.
Family structure or familial culture that constitutes more young adults living with their parents
indicates a stronger tie within the family.
3. Details about the variables and the construction of the variable for the strength of familial culture are
discussed in the data section.
4. The data for Sweden in 1999 appearing in both surveys are exactly the same; thus, those in WVS
were removed before the merge.
5. The instruction and syntax to merge the two data sets can be downloaded from the EVS website at: http://
www.europeanvaluesstudy.eu/evs/surveys/longitudinal-file-1981-2008/integratedvaluessurveys/ (last
accessed September 9, 2013).
6. We test the impact of familial culture on income by regressing equation (1), and both SUM and
PRINCIPAL represent the strength of family ties (SFT). They enter the regression one at a time. With
their high correlation, we should expect similar results for both.
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